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Linear-Quadratic Mean Field Games with a Major Player:
Nash certainty equivalence versus master equations∗
Minyi Huang †
Abstract
Mean field games with a major player were introduced in [26] within a linear-quadratic (LQ) mod-
eling framework. Due to the rich structure of major-minor player models, the past ten years have seen
significant research efforts for different solution notions and analytical techniques. For LQ models, we
address the relation between three solution frameworks: the Nash certainty equivalence (NCE) approach
in [26], master equations, and asymptotic solvability, which have been developed starting with different
ideas. We establish their equivalence relationships.
Keywords: Mean field games, linear-quadratic, major and minor players, Nash certainty equiva-
lence, master equations, asymptotic solvability.
1 Introduction
Mean field game theory was first developed for a population of comparably small but possibly heterogeneous
players; see an overview in [9]. A generalization of this theory is to consider a major player interacting
with a large number of minor players as initially introduced in [26]. Historically, games with major and
minor players have been studied in the literature, but usually for static cooperative decision models (see e.g.
[24, 37]).
When a major player interacts with a large number of minor players, a crucial feature is that the mean
field generated by the minor players is a random process even if the population size of the minor players
tends to infinity. This necessitates the characterization of the dynamic property of the mean field when the
players choose their strategies based on mean field approximations. This analytical complication is similar
to what happens in common noise models [7, 11, 14].
Following the major-minor player mean field game model introduced in [26], the same LQ framework
has been greatly extended by different authors. The reader is referred to [39] for non-uniform minor players,
[10, 18] for partial information, [31] for an application to optimal execution in fiance, [25] for system
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dynamics via backward differential equations, [33] for random entrance of agents, [36] for multi-scale
analysis and the notion of asymptotic solvability, and [19] for a convex analysis approach. Meanwhile, the
study of major-minor players in nonlinear models can be found in [6, 7, 8, 15, 16, 40]. Nourian and Caines
[40] treat the mean field as random measure flow driven by the major player’s Brownian motion and use
stochastic Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equations to solve the best responses. Bensoussan et al [6] use
stochastic adjoint equations to handle a pair of optimal control problems with a dominating player. Carmona
and Zhu [16] apply a stochastic maximum principle under a conditional law of the minor player. Sen and
Caines [41] consider partial information and control with nonlinear filtering. Lasry and Lions [35] introduce
master equations for a nonlinear major-minor player model. Cardaliaguet et al [12] analyze a convergence
problem for a major-minor player model with general nonlinear cost integrands, and it is shown that the pair
of master equations can be obtained as the limit of the HJB equations for the N + 1 players as N →∞.
The analysis of leadership or Stackelberg equilibria can be found in [44] for a discrete time model,
[4, 38] for LQ Stackelberg games, [5] for control delay, [29] for state feedback and time-consistency, [17]
for mean field principal-agent problems, [21] for an application to optimal portfolio liquidation, and [32]
for evolutionary inspection games under a major player’s pressure.
For LQ mean field games, the current literature has provided several routes: The Nash certainty equiv-
alence (NCE) approach, master equations, and asymptotic solvability. These solution methods start with
different ideas although they all look for a certain Nash equilibrium with state feedback information.
The NCE approach was initially developed for mean field games with all comparably small players.
One starts by considering an infinite population and fixing the mean field [27, 28]. Next a special stochastic
optimal control problem for a representative agent is solved by finding its best response strategy with re-
spect to the given mean field and subsequently letting the overall population implementing such strategies
regenerate the same mean field, leading to a fixed point problem. The set of strategies obtained is an ε-Nash
equilibrium for the finite population.
When extending the NCE approach in [28, 27] to the major player model, the method in [26] is to
augment the state space by an extra state describing the mean field generated by different types of minor
players. This Markovianizes the decision problems to be solved by the major player and a representative mi-
nor player. A key step is to assume a linear structure of the mean field dynamics and further find appropriate
constraints on its parameters by imposing consistency conditions.
The master equation approach assigns the player in question with its own value function and next de-
termines the optimization rule of all players. The mean field evolution is naturally determined by system
dynamics under the chosen strategies.
The notion of asymptotic solvability attempts to understand the large population decision problem from
a different point of view. It shares similarity to convergence problems in [13, 20, 34]. One can formally start
to write the dynamic programming equations for a sequence of Nash games with population sizes tending
to infinity. If for all sufficiently large populations, the game has a solution via the coupled Riccati equations
and moreover, the Riccati equation solutions maintain certain boundedness properties, we say the sequence
of games has asymptotic solvability. A basic question is how to characterize asymptotic solvability in terms
of some low dimensional structure that captures all essential information of the model. This question has
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been answered for LQ mean field games in [30] without a major player and in [36] with a major player.
When taking the approaches of Nash certainty equivalence or master equations or asymptotic solvability,
one typically obtains seemingly different solution structures. We are interested in studying the relationship
between these solution equations, and their uniqueness properties. This will shed light into the intrinsic
nature of these solutions and will be especially valuable when many solution formulations via different
information or interaction patterns exist for major-minor player models and when non-uniqueness results of
mean field games have been frequently seen in the literature [1, 3, 22, 23, 30, 43]. The main contribution
of the paper is to show that the NCE equation system is equivalent to the master equations when the latter
are restricted to quadratic solutions, and that for homogeneous minor players, the NCE equation system
has a solution if and only if asymptotic solvability holds. In contrast, for LQ mean field games without a
major player, the NCE equation system via consistent mean field approximations may have a solution but
asymptotic solvability fails [30].
The organization of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents a summary of the NCE approach adopted
in [26]. Section 3 introduces the master equations for the LQ mean field games with a major player and K
types of minor players and compares with the NCE equation system. Section 4 analyzes the special case of
homogeneous minor players; it first reviews the asymptotic solvability problem in [36] and next shows an
equivalence relationship between the solution of the NCE approach and asymptotic solvability. Section 5
concludes the paper.
Notation: We use (Ω,F , {Ft}t≥0, P ) to denote an underlying filtered probability space. Let S
n be the
set of n× n real and symmetric matrices, Sn+ its subset of positive semi-definite matrices, and Ik the k × k
identity matrix. Let P2(R
n) be the set of probability measures µ on Rn that have finite second moment.
Denote 〈y〉µ =
∫
Rn
yµ(dy) if the integral is finite. Given a symmetric matrix M ≥ 0, the quadratic
form zTMz may be denoted as |z|2M . For Z = (zjk) ∈ R
l×m, denote the l1-norm ‖Z‖l1 =
∑
j,k |zjk|.
For matrices A = (aij) ∈ R
l1×l2 , Aˆ ∈ Rl3×l4 , the Kronecker product A ⊗ Aˆ = (aijAˆ)1≤i≤l1,1≤j≤l2 ∈
R(l1l3)×(l2l4).
2 The LQ Mean Field Game with a Major Player
This section summarizes the methodology developed in [26] which considered an infinite horizon. The
model below takes a finite horizon for convenience of later comparison with master equations and asymp-
totic solvability by analyzing ordinary differential equations (ODEs). The approach in [26] is applied in a
straightforward manner.
We consider the LQ game with a major player A0 and N minor players Ai, 1 ≤ i ≤ N . The states of
A0 and Ai are, respectively, denoted by X0(t) and Xi(t), 1 ≤ i ≤ N , which satisfy the linear stochastic
differential equations (SDEs):
dX0(t) =
(
A0X0(t) +B0u0(t) + F0X
(N)(t)
)
dt+D0dW0(t), (1)
dXi(t) =
(
AθiXi(t) +Bui(t) + FX
(N)(t) +GX0(t)
)
dt+DdWi(t), (2)
1 ≤ i ≤ N, t ≥ 0,
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where we have state Xj ∈ R
n, control uj ∈ R
n1 , and X(N) = 1N
∑N
k=1Xk(t). The initial states
{Xj(0), 0 ≤ j ≤ N} are independent with EXj(0) = xj(0) and finite second moment. The N + 1
standard n2-dimensional Brownian motions {Wj , 0 ≤ j ≤ N} are independent and also independent of
the initial states. The subscript θi is a dynamic parameter to model a heterogenous population of minor
players. We assume θi takes values from the finite set Θ = {1, . . . ,K} modeling K types of minor players.
If θi = k, Ai is called a k-type minor player. The constant matrices A0, B0, F0, D0, Ak, B, F , G, D have
compatible dimensions. Denote u = (u0, · · · , uN ). The costs of the players are given by
J0(u) = E
∫ T
0
e−ρt
[
|X0(t)− Γ0X
(N)(t)− η0|
2
Q0 + |u0(t)|
2
R0
]
dt
+ e−ρTE|X0(T )− Γ0fX
(N)(T )− η0f |
2
Q0f
, (3)
Ji(u) = E
∫ T
0
e−ρt
[
|Xi(t)− Γ1X0(t)− Γ2X
(N)(t)− η|2Q + |ui(t)|
2
R
]
dt
+ e−ρTE|Xi(T )− Γ1fX0(T )− Γ2fX
(N)(T )− ηf |
2
Qf
, 1 ≤ i ≤ N, (4)
where ρ ≥ 0 is a discount factor. The constant matrices (or vectors) Q0, Γ0, η0, R0, Q0f , Γ0f , η0f , Q, Γ1,
Γ2, η, R, Qf , Γ1f , Γ2f , ηf above have compatible dimensions, and Q0 ≥ 0, Q0f ≥ 0, Q ≥ 0, Qf ≥ 0,
R0 > 0, R > 0. Our analysis can be easily extended to the case of time-dependent parameters. We only
take A(·) in (2) to be dependent on θi for the purpose of notational simplicity. When other parameters for
Ai also depend on θi, the analysis is similar.
For given N , define Ik = {i|θi = k, 1 ≤ i ≤ N}, Nk = |Ik|, where |Ik| is the cardinality of
Ik, 1 ≤ k ≤ K . Let π
(N)
k = Nk/N . Then π
(N) = (π
(N)
1 , · · · , π
(N)
K ) is the empirical distribution of
θ1, · · · , θN . We make the following assumptions.
(A1) There exists a probability vector π such that limN→∞ π
(N) = π, where π = (π1, · · · , πK) and
min1≤k≤K πk > 0.
(A2) The initial states Xj(0), 0 ≤ j ≤ N , are independent, EXi(0) = α0 for all i ≥ 1, and there exists
a fixed constant c0 such that supj≥0E|Xj(0)|
2 ≤ c0.
2.1 The limiting two-player model
Belowwe overview the steps in [26]. The key idea is to introduce a new process Z¯(t) = [Z¯T1 (t), · · · , Z¯
T
K(t)]
T
as a state component in an augmented state space, where Z¯k specifies the mean field generated by all k-type
minor players. The process Z¯ is described by the following equation
dZ¯(t) = [A(t)Z¯(t) +G(t)X0(t) +m(t)]dt, (5)
where Z¯k(0) = α0, and A(t) ∈ R
nK×nK ,G(t) ∈ RnK×n, andm(t) are continuous matrix or vector valued
functions on [0, T ]. The initial condition for (5) is due to the initial mean for the minor players as specified
in (A2). The triple (A,G,m) is not known in advance and needs to be determined as part of the solution.
After replacing X(N) in (1)–(4) by
∑K
k=1 πkZ¯k, we introduce two limiting optimal control problems for
the major player and a representative minor player. Let A¯0 and A¯i stand for the two players.
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Problem (P1): The major player A¯0 has dynamics and cost
dX¯0 =
[
A0X¯0 +B0u0 + F0
K∑
k=1
πkZ¯k
]
dt+D0dW0,
dZ¯ = (AZ¯ +GX¯0 +m)dt, t ≥ 0,
J¯0(u0(·)) = E
∫ T
0
e−ρt
{∣∣∣X¯0 − Γ0 K∑
k=1
πkZ¯k − η0
∣∣∣2
Q0
+ uT0R0u0
}
dt,
+ e−ρTE
∣∣∣X¯0(T )− Γ0f K∑
k=1
πkZ¯k(T )− η0f
∣∣∣2
Q0f
,
where X¯0(0) = X0(0) and Z¯k(0) = α0.
Problem (P2): The minor player A¯i has dynamics and cost
dX¯i =
[
AθiX¯i +Bui + F
K∑
k=1
πkZ¯k +GX¯0
]
dt+DdWi, (6)
dX¯0 =
[
A0X¯0 +B0uˆ0 + F0
K∑
k=1
πkZ¯k
]
dt+D0dW0,
dZ¯ = (AZ¯ +GX¯0 +m)dt, t ≥ 0,
J¯i(ui(·), uˆ0(·)) =E
∫ T
0
e−ρt
{∣∣∣X¯i − Γ1X¯0 − Γ2 K∑
k=1
πkZ¯k − η
∣∣∣2
Q
+ uTi Rui
}
dt,
+ e−ρTE
∣∣∣X¯i(T )− Γ1f X¯0(T )− Γ2f K∑
k=1
πkZ¯k(T )− ηf
∣∣∣2
Qf
,
where X¯i(0) = Xi(0), X¯0(0) = X0(0), Z¯k(0) = α0, and uˆ0 is the optimal control law solved from (P1).
To distinguish from the original model with N + 1 players, we use the new state variables X¯0 and X¯i.
But we still reuse the same set of variables u0, ui,W0 andWi in this infinite population limit model without
the risk of confusion.
2.2 Nash certainty equivalence solution
Step 1: Solution of Problem (P1)
We start by assuming that (A,G,m) has been known. Define
F pi0 = π ⊗ F0, Γ
pi
0 = π ⊗ Γ0, F
pi = π ⊗ F, Γ pi2 = π ⊗ Γ2,
A0(t) =
[
A0 F
pi
0
G A
]
, B0 =
[
B0
0nK×n1
]
, M0(t) =
[
0n×1
m
]
,
Qpi0 = [I,−Γ
pi
0 ]
TQ0[I,−Γ
pi
0 ], η¯
pi
0 = [I,−Γ
pi
0 ]
TQ0η0,
Qpi0f = [I,−Γ
pi
0f ]
TQ0f [I,−Γ
pi
0f ], η¯
pi
0f = [I,−Γ
pi
0f ]
TQ0fη0f .
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We introduce the ODE system
ρP0 =
dP0
dt
+ P0A0 + A
T
0 P0 − P0B0R
−1
0 B
T
0 P0 +Q
pi
0 , (7)
ρs0 =
ds0
dt
+ (AT0 − P0B0R
−1
0 B
T
0 )s0 + P0M0 − η¯
pi
0 , (8)
where P0(T ) = Q
pi
0f and s0(T ) = −η¯
pi
0f . The ODE system has a unique solution. The optimal control law
for A¯0 is
uˆ0 = −R
−1
0 B
T
0
[
P0(X¯
T
0 , Z¯
T )T + s0
]
.
Step 2: Solution of Problem (P2)
We suppose A¯i has its dynamic parameter θi = κ so that Aθi = Aκ. After taking the feedback control
law uˆ0 for A¯0, we have
d
 X¯iX¯0
Z¯
 = [ Aκ [G F pi]
0n(K+1)×n A0 − B0R
−1
0 B
T
0 P0
] X¯iX¯0
Z¯
 dt
+
[
B
0n(K+1)×n1
]
uidt+
[
0n×1
M0 − B0R
−1
0 B
T
0 s0
]
dt+
 DdWiD0dW0
0nK×1
 ,
where X¯i(0) = Xi(0), X¯0(0) = X0(0), Z¯(0) = α0 and P0 is solved from (7). Define
Aκ(t) =
[
Aκ [G F
pi]
0n(K+1)×n A0 − B0R
−1
0 B
T
0 P0
]
, B =
[
B
0n(K+1)×n1
]
,
M(t) =
[
0n×1
M0 − B0R
−1
0 B
T
0 s0
]
,
Qpi = [I,−Γ1,−Γ
pi
2 ]
TQ[I,−Γ1,−Γ
pi
2 ], η¯
pi = [I,−Γ1,−Γ
pi
2 ]
TQη,
Qpif = [I,−Γ1f ,−Γ
pi
2f ]
TQf [I,−Γ1f ,−Γ
pi
2f ], η¯
pi
f = [I,−Γ1f ,−Γ
pi
2f ]
TQfηf .
We introduce
ρPκ =
dPκ
dt
+ PκAκ + A
T
κPκ − PκBR
−1BTPκ +Q
pi, (9)
ρsκ =
dsκ
dt
+
(
ATκ − PκBR
−1BT
)
sκ + PκM− η¯
pi, (10)
where Pκ(T ) = Q
pi
f and sκ(T ) = −η¯
pi
f . The optimal control law for A¯i is given by
uˆi = −R
−1BT
[
Pκ(X¯
T
i , X¯
T
0 , Z¯
T )T + sκ
]
. (11)
Finally, substituting (11) into (6) gives
dX¯i = (AκX¯i +GX¯0 + F
piZ¯)dt−BR−1BTPκ(X¯
T
i , X¯
T
0 , Z¯
T )T dt
−BR−1BT sκdt+DdWi, (12)
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where X¯i(0) = Xi(0).
Step 3: The consistency condition
For the matrices Pκ, κ = 1, · · · ,K , we introduce the partition
Pκ = (Pκ,jl)1≤j,l≤3, (13)
where Pκ,11, Pκ,22 ∈ R
n×n, and Pκ,33 ∈ R
nK×nK . The matrix functions A(t), G(t) and vector function
m(t) are represented in the form
A(t) =

A1
...
AK
 , G(t) =

G1
...
GK
 , m(t) =

m1
...
mK
 , (14)
where Ak(t) ∈ R
n×nK , Gk(t) ∈ R
n×n andmk(t) ∈ R
n for 1 ≤ k ≤ K . Denote
ek = [0n×n, · · · , 0n×n, In, 0n×n, · · · , 0n×n] ∈ R
n×nK, (15)
where the identity matrix In is at the kth block, 1 ≤ k ≤ K . Now we consider the average state
(1/Nκ)
∑
i∈Iκ
Xi of Nκ κ-type minor players with closed-loop dynamics of the form (12). When N →∞
so thatNκ →∞, the limit of the state average is required to regenerate Z¯κ (which has been intended for the
approximation of (1/Nκ)
∑
i∈Iκ
Xi) such that
dZ¯κ =
{[
Aκ −BR
−1BTPκ,11
]
eκ + F
pi −BR−1BTPκ,13
}
Z¯dt
+ (G−BR−1BTPκ,12)X¯0dt−BR
−1BT sκdt, (16)
where Z¯ = [Z¯T1 , · · · , Z¯
T
K ]
T and Z¯κ(0) = α0. Now, under the NCE methodology, the resulting equation
system (16) is required to coincide with (5) which had been presumed in the first place. We call this
requirement the consistency condition.
2.3 The Nash certainty equivalence equation system
Based on Steps 1, 2 and 3, we introduce the first differential-algebraic system of equations (DAEs):
ρP0 = P˙0 + P0A0 + A
T
0 P0 − P0B0R
−1
0 B
T
0 P0 +Q
pi
0 ,
ρPκ = P˙κ + PκAκ + A
T
κPκ − PκBR
−1BTPκ +Q
pi, 1 ≤ κ ≤ K,
Aκ = (Aκ −BR
−1BTPκ,11)eκ + F
pi −BR−1BTPκ,13, ∀κ,
Gκ = G−BR
−1BTPκ,12, ∀κ,
(17)
where P0(T ) = Q
pi
0f and Pκ(T ) = Q
pi
f , and the second differential-algebraic system of equations (DAEs):
ρs0 = s˙0 + (A
T
0 − P0B0R
−1
0 B
T
0 )s0 + P0M0 − η¯
pi
0 ,
ρsκ = s˙κ + (A
T
κ − PκBR
−1BT )sκ + PκM− η¯
pi, 1 ≤ κ ≤ K,
mκ = −BR
−1BT sκ, ∀κ,
(18)
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where s0(T ) = −η¯
pi
0f and sκ(T ) = −η¯
pi
f . Note that m has been used in defining M0 and M. The equality
constraints for Aκ, Gκ in (17) andmκ in (18) result from the consistency condition specified in Step 3. The
combined differential-algebraic system of equations (17)–(18) will be called the NCE equation system. The
matrices A0 and Aκ now depend on the solution of the equation system. The solution of (17), if it exists,
can be solved without involving (18).
Denote
XP = C([0, T ];R
n(K+1)×n(K+1))× (C([0, T ];Rn(K+2)×n(K+2)))K
× C([0, T ];RnK×nK)× C([0, T ];RnK×n),
Xs = C([0, T ];R
n(K+1))× (C([0, T ];Rn(K+2)))K × C([0, T ];RnK).
Definition 1 A set of functions
(P0, P1, · · · , PK , A,G) ∈ XP , (s0, s1, · · · , sK ,m) ∈ Xs
satisfying (17)–(18) on [0, T ] is called a solution of the NCE equation system.
Lemma 2 We have the following assertions:
i) If (P0, P1, · · · , PK , A,G) ∈ XP is a solution of (17), then it is unique and P0 ∈ C([0, T ];S
n(K+1)
+ ),
Pκ ∈ C([0, T ];S
n(K+1)
+ ) for each 1 ≤ κ ≤ K .
ii) The NCE equation system has a solution if and only if (17) has a solution.
iii) If the NCE equation system has a solution in XP × Xs, it is unique.
Proof. i) By eliminating (A,G), we write A0 as a function of (P1, · · · , PK), and Aκ as a function
of (P0, P1, · · · , PK), and accordingly denote A0(P1, · · · , PK), Aκ(P0, P1, · · · , PK). Next we write the
ODEs of (P0, P1, · · · , PK) where the vector field is a continuous function of (P0, P1, · · · , PK) with local
Lipschitz continuity. Hence the solution (P0, P1, · · · , PK) is unique, which further uniquely determines
(A,G). After solving P0(t) and P1(t), · · · , PK(t), we denote
Aˆ0(t) = A0(P1(t), · · · , PK(t)), Aˆκ(t) = Aκ(P0(t), P1(t), · · · , PK(t)).
Consider the standard Riccati ODE
ρPˆ0 =
˙ˆ
P0 + Pˆ0Aˆ0 + Aˆ
T
0 Pˆ0 − Pˆ0B0R
−1
0 B
T
0 Pˆ0 +Q
pi
0 , Pˆ0(T ) = Q
pi
0f . (19)
We obtain a unique solution Pˆ0 ∈ C([0, T ];S
n(K+1)
+ ) [42]. Since P0 also satisfies (19), we necessarily
have Pˆ0 = P0. It follows that P0 ∈ C([0, T ];S
n(K+1)
+ ). Similarly we obtain Pκ ∈ C([0, T ];S
n(K+2)
+ ) for
1 ≤ κ ≤ K .
ii) Necessity is trivial. We show sufficiency. After solving (P0, P1, · · · , PK), we writeM0(s1, · · · , sK)
as a linear function of s1, · · · , sK , and M(s0, s1, · · · , sK) as a linear function of (s0, s1, · · · , sK). Then
(s0, s1, · · · , sK) is determined by a linear ODE system with time dependent coefficients and can be uniquely
solved. We further solve m.
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iii) Suppose (P0, P1, · · · , PKA,G, s0, s1, · · · , sK ,m) is a solution of the NCE equation system. Let
(P ′0, P
′
1, · · · , P
′
K , A
′
, G
′
, s′0, s
′
1, · · · , s
′
K ,m
′) be another solution. By part i), we have
(P0, P1, · · · , PK , A,G) = (P
′
0, P
′
1, · · · , P
′
K , A
′
, G
′
).
Consequently, (s0, s1, . . . , sK ,m) = (s
′
0, s
′
1, · · · , s
′
K ,m
′). Uniqueness follows. 
Remark 1 When T is replaced by∞, the system specified by (1)–(4) reduces to the model in [26], and (17)
is modified by replacing the two ODEs by two algebraic equations. For the infinite horizon case, (18) can
be retained as a differential-algebraic system of equations with no terminal condition, for which one can
impose appropriate growth conditions on the solutions (s0, sκ). The consideration of time-varying s0, sκ
means searching in a larger space than constant solutions.
Remark 2 A class of LQ stochastic optimal control problems is solved in [19] based on convex analysis and
the Gaˆteaux derivative of the cost; this approach is applied to solve the limiting optimal control problems
of the LQ mean field game with a major player for both the finite and infinite horizon cases. This recovers
both the NCE equation system obtained in [26] and (17)–(18).
3 The Master Equations and Their Relation to the NCE Approach
LetX†0(t) andZ
†
κ(t), 1 ≤ κ ≤ K , be the states of the major player and a minor player of type κ, respectively.
Let {µ†κ(t), 0 ≤ t ≤ T} denote the (random) measure flow as the mean field generated by all minor players
of type κ. Due to the correlation of the κ-type minor players’ states, the limit µ†κ(t) of their empirical
distribution is still random except for trivial cases.
For µ = (µ1, · · · , µK), where each µκ ∈ P2(R
n), define the mean function
z¯µκ = z¯κ = 〈y〉µκ ∈ R
n, z¯µ = [z¯T , · · · , z¯TK ]
T . (20)
More generally, for the measure flow {µ†(t) = (µ†1(t), · · · , µ
†
K(t)), 0 ≤ t ≤ T}, we denote z¯
µ†(t)
κ =
z¯κ(t) = 〈y〉µ†κ(t)
and z¯µ
†
(t) = z¯µ
†(t) = [z¯T1 (t), · · · , z¯
T
K(t)]
T . For this section, µ and µ† always contain K
components, and this should be clear from the context.
We introduce the following model with K + 1 players with dynamics
dX†0 = (A0X
†
0 +B0u0 + F
pi
0 z¯
µ†)dt+D0dW0, 0 ≤ t ≤ T,
dZ†κ = (AκZ
†
κ +Buκ +GX
†
0 + F
pi z¯µ
†
)dt+DdWκ, 1 ≤ κ ≤ K,
and costs
J0(u0, · · · , uK) = E
∫ T
0
e−ρt
{∣∣∣X†0 − Γ pi0 z¯µ† − η0∣∣∣2
Q0
+ uT0R0u0
}
dt,
+ e−ρTE
∣∣∣X†0(T )− Γ pi0f z¯µ†(T )− η0f ∣∣∣2
Q0f
Jκ(u0, · · · , uK) = E
∫ T
0
e−ρt
{∣∣∣Z†κ − Γ1X†0 − Γ pi2 z¯µ† − η∣∣∣2
Q
+ uTκRuκ
}
dt,
+ e−ρTE
∣∣∣Z†κ(T )− Γ1fX†0(T )− Γ pi2f z¯µ†(T )− ηf ∣∣∣2
Qf
, 1 ≤ κ ≤ K.
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The parameters in the dynamics and costs are the same as in (1)–(4). The major player takes (X†0 , µ
†) as the
state variable in its control problem, and the κ-type minor player takes (Z†κ,X
†
0 , µ
†) as the state variable.
Take the initial time t and initial state (x0, µ) (resp., (zκ, x0, µ)) for the major player (resp., the κ-type
minor player). Denote the value functions V0(t, x0, µ), Vκ(t, zκ, x0, µ), where t ∈ [0, T ], x0, zκ ∈ R
n and
µ = (µ1, · · · , µK), µκ ∈ P2(R
n).
We have the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (master) equations
− ∂tV0 + ρV0 (21)
= ∂Tx0V0(A0x0 +B0uˆ0 + F
pi
0 z¯
µ)
+ |x0 − Γ
pi
0 z¯
µ − η0|
2
Q0 + uˆ
T
0R0uˆ0 + (1/2)Tr(∂x0x0V0D0D
T
0 )
+
K∑
l=1
∫
∂Tyl(∂µlV0)(t, x0, µ; yl)[Alyl +Buˆl(t, x0, yl, µ) +Gx0 + F
pi z¯µ]µl(dyl)
+
K∑
l=1
∫
1
2
Tr[∂ylyl(∂µlV0)(t, x0, µ; yl)DD
T ]µl(dyl),
where V0(T, x0, µ) = |x0 − Γ
pi
0f z¯
µ − η0f |
2
Q0
, and
− ∂tVκ + ρVκ (22)
= ∂Tx0Vκ(A0x0 +B0uˆ0 + F
pi
0 z¯
µ) + (1/2)Tr(∂x0x0VκD0D
T
0 )
+ ∂TzκVκ(Aκzk +Buˆκ +Gx0 + F
pi z¯µ)
+ |zκ − Γ1x0 − Γ
pi
2 z¯
µ − η|2Q + uˆ
T
κRuˆκ + (1/2)Tr(∂zκzκVκDD
T )
+
K∑
l=1
∫
∂Tyl(∂µlVκ)(t, zk, x0, µ; yl)[Alyl +Buˆl(t, x0, yl, µ) +Gx0 + F
pi z¯µ]µl(dyl)
+
K∑
l=1
∫
1
2
Tr[∂ylyl(∂µlVκ)(t, zk, x0, µ; yl)DD
T ]µl(dyl),
where Vκ(T, zκ, x0, µ) = |zκ − Γ1fx0 − Γ
pi
2f z¯
µ − ηf |
2
Qf
.
We may regard (21)–(22) as K + 1 dynamic programming equations which are formally derived by a
local expansion of V0(t + ǫ,X
†
0(t + ǫ), µ
†(t + ǫ)) and Vκ(t + ǫ, Z
†
κ(t + ǫ),X
†
0(t + ǫ), µ
†(t + ǫ)) given
X†0(t) = x0, Z
†
κ(t) = zκ, µ
†(t) = µ. Each of the equilibrium strategies in (uˆ0, uˆ1, · · · , uˆK) is selected as a
best response to maximize its own Hamiltonian. This amounts to finding
uˆ0 = argmax
u0
(−∂Tx0V0B0u0 − u
T
0R0u0),
uˆκ = argmax
uκ
(−∂TzκVκBuκ − u
T
κRuκ). (23)
The integral terms in (21)–(22) account for the variation of the value function that is caused by the small
perturbation of the mean field term. The choice of uˆκ in (23) does not directly use the integral terms since
the control of the minor player in question has little impact on the mean field. The reader may consult
[12, 35] for master equations of nonlinear major player models, and [13] for differentiation with respect to
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probability measures. Note that after differentiation of the value functions, a new variable yl arises so that
we write
(∂µlV0)(t, x0, µ; yl), (∂µlVκ)(t, zk, x0, µ; yl). (24)
We determine
BT0 ∂x0V0 + 2R0uˆ0 = 0, B
T∂TzκVκ + 2Ruˆκ = 0,
which gives
uˆ0(t, x0, µ) = −(1/2)R
−1
0 B
T
0 ∂x0V0(t, x0, µ), (25)
uˆκ(t, zκ, x0, µ) = −(1/2)R
−1BT∂zκVκ(t, zκ, x0, µ). (26)
Next, substituting (25)–(26) into (21)–(22) we obtain
− ∂tV0 + ρV0 (27)
= ∂Tx0V0(A0x0 + F
pi
0 z¯
µ)− (1/4)∂Tx0V0B0R
−1
0 B
T
0 ∂x0V0
+ |x0 − Γ
pi
0 z¯
µ − η0|
2
Q0 + (1/2)Tr(∂x0x0V0D0D
T
0 )
+
K∑
l=1
∫
∂Tyl(∂µlV0)(t, x0, µ; yl)(Alyl +Gx0 + F
pi z¯µ)µl(dyl)
−
K∑
l=1
∫
1
2
∂Tyl(∂µlV0)(t, x0, µ; yl)BR
−1BT∂ylVl(t, yl, x0, µ)µl(dyl)
+
K∑
l=1
∫
1
2
Tr[∂ylyl(∂µlV0)(t, x0, µ; yl)DD
T ]µl(dyl),
where V0(T, x0, µ) = |x0 − Γ
pi
0f z¯
µ − η0f |
2
Q0
, and
− ∂tVκ + ρVκ (28)
= ∂Tx0Vκ(A0x0 + F
pi
0 z¯
µ)− (1/2)∂Tx0VκB0R
−1
0 B
T
0 ∂x0V0
+ (1/2)Tr(∂x0x0VκD0D
T
0 )
+ ∂TzκVκ(Aκzκ +Gx0 + F
pi z¯µ)− (1/4)∂TzκVκBR
−1BT∂zκVκ
+ |zκ − Γ1x0 − Γ
pi
2 z¯
µ − η|2Q + (1/2)Tr(∂zκzκVκDD
T )
+
K∑
l=1
∫
∂Tyl(∂µlVκ)(t, zκ, x0, µ; yl)(Alyl +Gx0 + F
pi z¯µ)µl(dyl)
−
K∑
l=1
∫
1
2
∂Tyl(∂µlVκ)(t, zκ, x0, µ; yl)BR
−1BT∂ylVl(t, x0, yl, µ)µl(dyl)
+
K∑
l=1
∫
1
2
Tr[∂ylyl(∂µlVκ)(t, zκ, x0, µ; yl)DD
T ]µl(dyl),
where Vκ(T, zκ, x0, µ) = |zκ − Γ1fx0 − Γ
pi
2f z¯
µ − ηf |
2
Qf
. We call (27) and (28) the master equations.
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For the right hand side of (27), we denote it as
χ0 := χ0,1 − χ0,2 + χ0,3 + χ0,4 + χ0,5 − χ0,6 + χ0,7,
where each constituent term stands for the term in the master equation taking the same place. Similarly, the
right hand side of (28) is written as
χ := χ1 − χ2 + χ3 + χ4 − χ5 + χ6 + χ7 + χ8 − χ9 + χ10.
3.1 Quadratic solutions
Recalling (20), for µ = (µ1, · · · , µK), we now simply denote z¯κ = 〈y〉µκ ∈ R
n and z¯ = [z¯T1 , · · · , z¯
T
K ]
T .
Denote ξ0 = [x
T
0 , z¯
T ]T and ξκ = [z
T
κ , x
T
0 , z¯
T ]T .We are interested in solutions of the following form:
V0(t, x0, µ) = ξ
T
0 P
†
0(t)ξ0 + 2s
†T
0 (t)ξ0 + r
†
0(t), (29)
Vκ(t, zκ, x0, µ) = ξ
T
κP
†
κ(t)ξκ + 2s
†T
κ (t)ξκ + r
†
κ(t), 1 ≤ κ ≤ K, (30)
whereP
†
0(t) andP
†
κ(t) are symmetric matrix functions of t ∈ [0, T ], and the coefficient functions are differ-
entiable on [0, T ]. Such a solution (V0, V1, · · · , VK) is called a quadratic solution to the master equations.
Denote the partition P
†
0(t) = (P
†
0,jl)1≤j,l≤2 and P
†
κ(t) = (P
†
κ,jl)1≤j,l≤3, whereP
†
0,11 ∈ R
n×n,P
†
0,22 ∈
RnK×nK, P
†
κ,11, P
†
κ,22 ∈ R
n×n, P
†
κ,33 ∈ R
nK×nK . Denote
s
†
0(t) =
[
s
†
0,1
s
†
0,2
]
, s†κ(t) =
s
†
κ,1
s
†
κ,2
s
†
κ,3
 ,
where s
†
0,1 ∈ R
n, s
†
0,2 ∈ R
nK , s
†
κ,1 ∈ R
n, s
†
κ,2 ∈ R
n, and s
†
κ,3 ∈ R
nK .
In order to calculate the integral terms in the master equations to analyze quadratic solutions, we intro-
duce some notation. For 1 ≤ l ≤ K , denote
A
†
l (t) = (Al −BR
−1BTP†l,11)eK + F
pi −BR−1BTP†l,13,
G
†
l (t) = G−BR
−1BTP†l,12,
m
†
l (t) = −BR
−1BT s†l,1, (31)
and
A
†
(t) =

A
†
1
...
A
†
K
 , G†(t) =

G
†
1
...
G
†
K
 , m†(t) =

m
†
1
...
m
†
K
 , (32)
A†κ(t) =
 Aκ G F
pi
0n×n A0 −B0R
−1
0 B
T
0 P
†
0,11 F
pi
0 −B0R
−1
0 B
T
0 P
†
0,12
0nK×n G
†
A
†
 .
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We introduce the system of ODEs:
ρP†0 − P˙
†
0 = P
†
0
[
A0 F
pi
0
G
†
A
†
]
+
[
A0 F
pi
0
G
†
A
†
]T
P
†
0 −P
†
0B0R
−1
0 B
T
0P
†
0 +Q
pi
0 (33)
ρP†κ − P˙
†
κ = P
†
κA
†
κ + A
†T
κ P
†
κ −P
†
κBR
−1BTP†κ +Q
pi, 1 ≤ κ ≤ K, (34)
where P
†
0(T ) = Q
pi
0f and P
†
κ(T ) = Qpif . The K + 1 equations are all coupled together through the depen-
dence of (G
†
,A
†
,A†κ) on (P
†
0,P
†
1, · · · ,P
†
K).
We further introduce the ODE system:
ρs†0 − s˙
†
0 =
[
A0 F
pi
0
G
†
A
†
]T
s
†
0 −
[
P
†
0,11
P
†
0,21
]
B0R
−1
0 B
T
0 s
†
0,1 +
[
P
†
0,12
P
†
0,22
]
m
† − η¯pi0 , (35)
ρs†κ − s˙
†
κ = (A
†T
κ −P
†
κBR
−1BT )s†κ−
P
†
κ,12
P
†
κ,22
P
†
κ,32
B0R−10 BT0 s†0,1+
P
†
κ,13
P
†
κ,23
P
†
κ,33
m†−η¯pi, (36)
where s
†
0(T ) = −η¯
pi
0f and s
†
κ(T ) = −η¯pif , 1 ≤ κ ≤ K . Note that by (32), m
† is expressed in terms of
(s†1, · · · , s
†
K).
Theorem 3 The system of master equations (27)–(28) has a quadratic solution (29)–(30) if and only if
(P†0, · · · ,P
†
K) satisfies (33)–(34) on [0, T ], which further determines (s
†
0, s
†
1, · · · , s
†
K) as a unique solution
of (35)–(36) on [0, T ].
Proof. See appendix A. 
Theorem 4 The NCE equation system (17)–(18) has a solution as specified in Definition 1 if and only if the
master equation system (27)–(28) has a quadratic solution of the form (29)–(30). If their solutions exist,
they are unique and moreover
Pk = P
†
k, sk = s
†
k, for k = 0, 1, · · · ,K. (37)
Proof. First of all, the NCE equation system has a solution if and only if (17) has a solution, which is
necessarily unique. By Theorem 3, the master equation system has a quadratic solution if and only if (33)–
(34) has a solution.
We rewrite the ODE system of (P0, · · · , PK) by expressing (A,G) in (17) in terms of (P1, · · · , PK).
The gives a new ODE system where the vector field only has the unknowns (P0, P1, · · · , PK). Subsequently
we see that the above new vector field is the same as the one for (P†0, · · · ,P
†
K) in (33)–(34). This proves
the first part of the theorem together with Pk = P
†
k for all 0 ≤ k ≤ K . By showing the equivalence between
the two ODE systems (18) and (35)–(36), we further obtain sk = s
†
k for all 0 ≤ k ≤ K . 
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3.2 Comparison of feedback control laws
Suppose (27)–(28) has a quadratic solution. By (25)–(26) and (29)–(30), we have
u0(t) = −R
−1
0 B
T
0 (P
†
0,11X
†
0(t) +P
†
0,12z¯(t) + s
†
0,1(t)), (38)
uκ(t) = −R
−1BT (P†κ,11Z
†
κ(t) +P
†
κ,12X
†
0(t) +P
†
κ,13z¯(t) + s
†
κ,1(t)), (39)
where the right hand sides use the value of the processes at time t. We need to determine the equation of z¯.
Under (38)–(39) we have the closed-loop equation
dZ†κ = (AκZ
†
κ +GX
†
0 + F
pi z¯)dt+DdWκ
−BR−1BT (P†κ,11Z
†
κ +P
†
κ,12X
†
0 +P
†
κ,13z¯ + s
†
κ,1)dt. (40)
ConsiderNκ κ-type players with independent Brownian motions and initial states of mean α0. We take their
empirical mean by averaging (40) and let Nκ → ∞. The limit of the empirical mean should regenerate z¯,
and this derives
dz¯κ = ((Aκ −BR
−1BTP†κ,11)eκ + F
pi −BR−1BTP†κ,13)z¯dt
+ (G−BR−1BTP†κ,12)X
†
0dt−BR
−1BT s†κ,1dt, (41)
where z¯κ(0) = α0.
By (37) and (16), if we set θi = κ, X
†
κ(0) = X¯i(0), X
†
0(0) = X¯0(0), and Wκ = Wi, the process
(X†κ,X
†
0 , z¯) under the strategies (38)–(39) is equal to the process (X¯i, X¯0, Z¯) under the NCE based strate-
gies. Accordingly, the two sets of control laws are equivalent.
4 Homogeneous Minor Players
For this section, all minor players form a single type so that Aθi ≡ A. The state processes of the N + 1
players Ak, 0 ≤ k ≤ N , satisfy the SDEs:
dX0(t) =
(
A0X0(t) +B0u0(t) + F0X
(N)(t)
)
dt+D0dW0(t), (42)
dXi(t) =
(
AXi(t) +Bui(t) + FX
(N)(t) +GX0(t)
)
dt+DdWi(t), (43)
1 ≤ i ≤ N, t ≥ 0,
The costs are given by (3)–(4).
4.1 The Nash certainty equivalence equation system
We follow the notation in Section 2.2 to denote
A0(t) =
[
A0 F0
G(t) A(t)
]
, B0 =
[
B0
0n×n1
]
, M0(t) =
[
0n×1
m(t)
]
Q0 = [I,−Γ0]
TQ0[I,−Γ0], η¯0 = [I,−Γ0]
TQ0η0
Q0f = [I,−Γ0f ]
TQ0f [I,−Γ0f ], η¯0f = [I,−Γ0f ]
TQ0fη0f ,
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where we have A(t), G(t) ∈ Rn×n,m(t) ∈ Rn. Denote
A(t) =
[
A [G F ]
02n×n A0(t)− B0R
−1
0 B
T
0 P0(t)
]
, B =
[
B
02n×n1
]
,
M(t) =
[
0n×1
M0 − B0R
−1
0 B
T
0 s0
]
,
Q = [I,−Γ1,−Γ2]
TQ[I,−Γ1,−Γ2], η¯ = [I,−Γ1,−Γ2]
TQη,
Qf = [I,−Γ1f ,−Γ2f ]
TQf [I,−Γ1f ,−Γ2f ], η¯f = [I,−Γ1f ,−Γ2f ]
TQfηf .
The NCE equation system (17)–(18) now reduces to i)
ρP0 = P˙0 + P0A0 + A
T
0 P0 − P0B0R
−1
0 B
T
0 P0 +Q0,
ρP1 = P˙1 + P1A+ A
TP1 − P1BR
−1BTP1 +Q,
A(t) = A+ F −BR−1BTP1,11 −BR
−1BTP1,13,
G(t) = G−BR−1BTP1,12,
(44)
where P0(T ) = Q0f , P1(T ) = Qf ,
P1 = (P1,jk)1≤j,k≤3 P1,jk(t) ∈ R
n×n,
and ii) 
ρs0 = s˙0 + (A
T
0 − P0B0R
−1
0 B
T
0 )s0 + P0M0 − η¯0,
ρs1 = s˙1 + (A
T − P1BR
−1BT )s1 + P1M− η¯,
m(t) = −BR−1BT s1(t),
(45)
where s0(T ) = −η¯0f , s1(T ) = −η¯f .
4.2 The asymptotic solvability problem
To begin with, we provide some background on asymptotic solvability based on [36]. Denote by 1k×l a
k × l matrix with all entries equal to 1, and by the column vectors {ek1 , . . . , e
k
k} the canonical basis of R
k.
For instance, ek1 = [1, 0, · · · , 0]
T ∈ Rk. Define
x = (xT0 ,x
T
1 , · · · ,x
T
N )
T ∈ R(N+1)n,
X(t) =

X0(t)
...
XN (t)
 ∈ R(N+1)n, W (t) =

W0(t)
...
WN (t)
 ∈ R(N+1)n2 ,
Â = diag[A0, A, · · · , A] +
[
0n×n, 11×N ⊗
F0
N
1N×1 ⊗G, 1N×N ⊗
F
N
]
,
D̂ = diag[D0,D, · · · ,D] ∈ R
(N+1)n×(N+1)n2 ,
B0 = e
N+1
1 ⊗B0 ∈ R
(N+1)n×n1 ,
Bk = e
N+1
k+1 ⊗B ∈ R
(N+1)n×n1 , 1 ≤ k ≤ N.
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Now we write (42) and (43) in the form
dX(t) =
(
ÂX(t) +
N∑
k=0
Bkuk(t)
)
dt+ D̂dW (t), t ≥ 0. (46)
We consider closed-loop perfect state (CLPS) information [2] so that X(t) is observed by each player,
and look for Nash strategies. Let u−k denote the strategies of all players other than Ak. A set of strategies
(uˆ0, · · · , uˆN ) is a Nash equilibrium if for all 0 ≤ k ≤ N , we have Jk(uˆk, uˆ−k) ≤ Jk(uk, uˆ−k), for any state
feedback based strategy uk which together with uˆ−k ensures a unique solution of X(t) on [0, T ]. Denote
K0 = [In, 0, · · · , 0] −
1
N [0, Γ0, · · · , Γ0],
K0f = [In, 0, · · · , 0] −
1
N [0, Γ0f , · · · , Γ0f ],
Q0 = K
T
0 Q0K0, Q0f = K
T
0fQ0fK0f ,
Ki = [0, 0, · · · , In, 0, · · · , 0] − [Γ1, 0, · · · , 0]−
1
N [0, Γ2, · · · , Γ2], (47)
Kif = [0, 0, · · · , In, 0, · · · , 0]− [Γ1f , 0, · · · , 0] −
1
N [0, Γ2f , · · · , Γ2f ],
Qi = K
T
i QKi, Qif = K
T
ifQfKif ,
Âρ/2 = Â− ρI/2, Âρ = Â− ρI,
where In is the (i+1)th submatrix in (47). We haveK0,Ki ∈ R
n×(N+1)n andQ0,Qi ∈ R
(N+1)n×(N+1)n.
Based on [36], we introduce the equation system:
P˙0(t) = −
(
P0Âρ/2 + Â
T
ρ/2P0
)
+ P0B0R
−1
0 B
T
0 P0
+P0
∑N
k=1BkR
−1BTk Pk +
∑N
k=1PkBkR
−1BTk P0 −Q0,
P0(T ) = Q0f ,
(48)

S˙0(t) = −Â
T
ρS0 +P0B0R
−1
0 B
T
0 S0 +
∑N
k=1PkBkR
−1BTk S0
+P0
∑N
k=1BkR
−1BTk Sk +K
T
0 Q0η0,
S0(T ) = −K
T
0fQ0fη0f ,
(49)

P˙i(t) = −
(
PiÂρ/2 + Â
T
ρ/2Pi
)
− PiBiR
−1BTi Pi
+
(
PiB0R
−1
0 B
T
0 P0 + P0B0R
−1
0 B
T
0 Pi
)
+
(
Pi
∑N
k=1BkR
−1BTk Pk +
∑N
k=1PkBkR
−1BTk Pi
)
−Qi,
Pi(T ) = Qif , 1 ≤ i ≤ N,
(50)

S˙i(t) = −Â
T
ρSi + P0B0R
−1
0 B0
TSi
+PiB0R
−1
0 B
T
0 S0 − PiBiR
−1BTi Si
+
∑N
k=1PkBkR
−1BTk Si + Pi
∑N
k=1BkR
−1BTk Sk +K
T
i Qη,
Si(T ) = −K
T
ifQfηf , 1 ≤ i ≤ N.
(51)
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The analysis in [36] is for costs without discount. The notion of asymptotic solvability and main results in
[36] can be translated to the discounted case verbatim once we let Âρ/2 take the role of Â used in [36] for
Riccati ODEs.
Suppose that (48) and (50) have a unique solution (P0, · · · ,PN ) on [0, T ]. Then we can uniquely solve
(49), (51), and the Nash game of N + 1 players has a set of feedback Nash strategies given by
uˆ0(t) = −R
−1
0 B
T
0 (P0X(t) + S0),
uˆi(t) = −R
−1BTi (PiX(t) + Si), 1 ≤ i ≤ N.
The solution of the feedback Nash strategies completely reduces to the study of (48) and (50).
Definition 5 [36] The sequence of Nash games specified by (42)–(43) and (3)–(4) has asymptotic solvability
if there exists N0 such that for all N ≥ N0, the Riccati ODE system consisting of (48) and (50) has a
solution (P0, · · · ,PN ) on [0, T ] and supN≥N0,0≤t≤T
(
‖P0(t)‖l1 + ‖P1(t)‖l1
)
<∞.
Denote
M0 = B0R
−1
0 B
T
0 , M = BR
−1BT .
We introduce the ODE system:
Λ˙01 = ρΛ
0
1 + Λ
0
1M0Λ
0
1 − (Λ
0
1A0 +A
T
0 Λ
0
1)
+Λ02(MΛ
T
a −G) + (ΛaM −G
T )Λ02
T
−Q0,
Λ˙02 = ρΛ
0
2 + (Λ
0
1M0 −A
T
0 )Λ
0
2 + Λ
0
2(M(Λ1 + Λ2)−A− F )
−Λ01F0 + (ΛaM −G
T )Λ03 +Q0Γ0,
Λ˙03 = ρΛ
0
3 + Λ
0
2
T
M0Λ
0
2 − Λ
0
2
T
F0 − F
T
0 Λ
0
2
+Λ03(M(Λ1 + Λ2)−A− F )
+((Λ1 + Λ
T
2 )M −A
T − F T )Λ03 − Γ
T
0 Q0Γ0,
Λ˙0 = ρΛ0 + ΛaMΛ
T
a − ΛbG−G
TΛTb
+Λ0(M0Λ
0
1 −A0) + (Λ
0
1M0 −A
T
0 )Λ0
−Λa(G−MΛ
T
b )− (G
T − ΛbM)Λ
T
a − Γ
T
1 QΓ1,
Λ˙1 = ρΛ1 + Λ1MΛ1 − Λ1A−A
TΛ1 −Q,
Λ˙2 = ρΛ2 + Λ
T
a (M0Λ
0
2 − F0)− Λ1F + (Λ1M −A
T )Λ2
+Λ2(M(Λ1 + Λ2)−A− F ) +QΓ2,
Λ˙3 = ρΛ3 + Λ
T
b M0Λ
0
2 + Λ
0
2
T
M0Λb + Λ
T
2MΛ2
−ΛTb F0 − F
T
0 Λb − Λ
T
2 F − F
TΛ2
+Λ3(M(Λ1 + Λ2)−A− F )
+((Λ1 + Λ
T
2 )M −A
T − F T )Λ3 − Γ
T
2 QΓ2,
Λ˙a = ρΛa + (Λ
0
1M0 −A
T
0 )Λa + Λa(MΛ1 −A)
−GTΛ1 + (ΛaM −G
T )ΛT2 + Γ
T
1 Q,
Λ˙b = ρΛb + Λ0M0Λ
0
2 + (ΛaM −G
T )(Λ2 + Λ3)− Λ0F0
−ΛaF + Λb(M(Λ1 + Λ2)−A− F )
+(Λ01M0 −A
T
0 )Λb − Γ
T
1 QΓ2,
(52)
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where the terminal conditions are
Λ01(T ) = Q0f , Λ
0
2(T ) = −Q0fΓ0f , Λ
0
3(T ) = Γ
T
0fQ0fΓ0f ,
Λ0(T ) = Γ
T
1fQfΓ1f , Λ1(T ) = Qf ,
Λ2(T ) = −QfΓ2f , Λ3(T ) = Γ
T
2fQfΓ2f ,
Λa(T ) = −Γ
T
1fQf , Λb(T ) = Γ
T
1fQfΓ2f .
To give the reader some insights, we explain from where the equations in (52) arise. Note that asymptotic
solvability is stated in terms of (P0,P1, · · · ,PK), the dimension of which increases with the population
size. The discount factor having been absorbed in Âρ/2, we follow the procedure in [36] to isolate a low
dimensional structure from (P0,P1, · · · ,PK). Specifically, by exploiting symmetry of the ODEs (48) and
(50), it can be shown that the large matrix P0 is formed from 3 distinct n×n submatrices by arranging them
into N2 places. Similarly, P1 is formed from 6 distinct n × n submatrices. Any other matrix Pk, k ≥ 2,
is determined from P1 by appropriate simultaneous row and column permutations. By using the above 9
submatrices and applying appropriate re-scaling to individual submatrices, we derive the ODE system (52)
as N →∞; see [36] for more details.
Theorem 6 [36] The sequence of games with dynamics (42)–(43) and costs (3)–(4) has asymptotic solv-
ability if and only if (52) has a solution on [0, T ].
Theorem 7 The NCE equation system (44)–(45) has a solution on [0, T ] if and only if asymptotic solvability
holds.
Proof. By Lemma 2, (44)–(45) has a solution if and only if (44) has a solution on [0, T ]; in addition,
P0 and P1 in such a solution are symmetric. We denote the two matrix functions P0 and P1 in (44) in the
form
P0(t) =
[
Φ01 Φ
0
2
Φ0T2 Φ
0
3
]
, P1(t) =
Φ1 Φ
T
a Φ2
Φa Φ0 Φb
ΦT2 Φ
T
b Φ3
 ,
where each submatrix is n× n. For A0 and A in (44), we rewrite
A0(t) =
[
A0 F0
G−MΦTa A+ F −M(Φ1 + Φ2)
]
,
A(t) =
 A G F0n×n A0 −M0Φ01 F0 −M0Φ02
0n×n G−MΦ
T
a A+ F −M(Φ1 + Φ2)
 .
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From (44) we obtain the following ODE system
Φ˙01 = ρΦ
0
1 − Φ
0
1A0 −A
T
0 Φ
0
1 − Φ
0
2(G−MΦ
T
a )
−(GT − ΦaM)Φ
0T
2 + Φ
0
1M0Φ
0
1 −Q0,
Φ˙02 = ρΦ
0
2 − Φ
0
1F0 − Φ
0
2(A+ F −M(Φ1 + Φ2))
−AT0 Φ
0
2 + (ΦaM −G
T )Φ03 + Φ
0
1M0Φ
0
2 +Q0Γ0,
Φ˙03 = ρΦ
0
3 − Φ
0T
2 F0 − F
T
0 Φ
0
2 − Φ
0
3(A+ F −M(Φ1 + Φ2))
−(A+ F −M(Φ1 + Φ2))
TΦ03 + Φ
0T
2 M0Φ
0
2 − Γ
T
0 Q0Γ0,
Φ˙0 = ρΦ0 − ΦaG− Φ0(A0 −M0Φ
0
1)− Φb(G−MΦ
T
a )−G
TΦTa
−(AT0 − Φ
0
1M0)Φ0 − (G
T − ΦaM)Φ
T
b + ΦaMΦ
T
a − Γ
T
1 QΓ1,
Φ˙1 = ρΦ1 − Φ1A−A
TΦ1 + Φ1MΦ1 −Q,
Φ˙2 = ρΦ2 − Φ1F − Φ
T
a (F0 −M0Φ
0
2)− Φ2(A+ F −M(Φ1 + Φ2))
−ATΦ2 + Φ1MΦ2 +QΓ2,
Φ˙3 = ρΦ3 − Φ
T
2 F − F
TΦ2 − Φ
T
b (F0 −M0Φ
0
2)− (F
T
0 − Φ
0T
2 M0)Φb
−Φ3(A+ F −M(Φ1 + Φ2))− (A+ F −M(Φ1 + Φ2))
TΦ3
+ΦT2MΦ2 − Γ
T
2 QΓ2,
Φ˙a = ρΦa − ΦaA−G
TΦ1 − (A
T
0 − Φ
0
1M0)Φa
−(GT − ΦaM)Φ
T
2 + ΦaMΦ1 + Γ
T
1 Q,
Φ˙b = ρΦb − ΦaF − Φ0(F0 −M0Φ
0
2)− Φb(A+ F −M(Φ1 + Φ2))
−GTΦ2 − (A
T
0 − Φ
0
1M0)Φb − (G
T − ΦaM)Φ3
+ΦaMΦ2 − Γ
T
1 QΓ2,
(53)
where the terminal conditions are given by
Φ01(T ) = Q0f , Φ
0
2(T ) = −Q0fΓ0f , Φ
0
3(T ) = Γ
T
0fQ0fΓ0f ,
Φ0(T ) = Γ
T
1fQfΓ1f , Φ1(T ) = Qf ,
Φ2(T ) = −QfΓ2f , Φ3(T ) = Γ
T
2fQfΓ2f ,
Φa(T ) = −Γ
T
1fQf , Φb(T ) = Γ
T
1fQfΓ2f .
By comparing the individual equations at the corresponding place of (52) and (53), we see the two equation
systems are determined by the same vector field with the same terminal conditions, and therefore they have
the same solution. In view of Theorem 6 and Lemma 2, the theorem follows. 
Remark 3 The equation system (52) originates from the ODE system of P0, P1, · · · , PK . But (53), which
is equivalent to (52), arises from solving two optimal control problems in a low dimensional space as in
Section 2.2.
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5 Conclusion
This paper considers LQ mean field games with a major player and investigates the relationship between
several solution frameworks. For a model of minor players of several subpopulations, an equivalence rela-
tionship is established between the Nash certainty equivalence approach and master equations. For a model
with homogeneous minor players, it is shown that the Nash certainty equivalence solution exists if and only
if asymptotic solvability holds.
Appendix A: Proof of Theorem 3
Note that if (P†0, · · · ,P
†
K) is a solution of (33)–(34) on [0, T ], it is the unique solution by the local Lipschitz
continuity of the vector fields in theK + 1 matrix ODEs. By (31),m† depends linearly on (s†1, · · · , s
†
K). If
(P†0, · · · ,P
†
K) exists on [0, T ], we may uniquely solve (s
†
0, s
†
1, · · · , s
†
K) from a system of linear ODEs with
bounded coefficients.
We now take (29)–(30) defined for t ∈ [0, T ] as a candidate solution of the master equations. Our plan is
to substitute (V0, · · · , VK) into the right hand side of each of theK +1 equations in (27)–(28) and simplify
the expression into a quadratic form of ξ0 or ξκ. We directly compute the derivatives:
∂x0V0 = 2[P
†
0,11,P
†
0,12]ξ0 + 2s
†
0,1, ∂x0x0V0 = 2P
†
0,11,
∂x0Vκ = 2[P
†
κ,21,P
†
κ,22,P
†
κ,23]ξκ + 2s
†
κ,2, ∂x0x0Vκ = 2P
†
κ,22,
∂zκVκ = 2[P
†
κ,11,P
†
κ,12,P
†
κ,13]ξκ + 2s
†
κ,1, ∂zκzκVκ = 2P
†
κ,11.
To facilitate the subsequent computation, we state two lemmas involving derivatives with respect to
probability measures. Recall the notation in (24).
Lemma A.1 Suppose V0 and Vκ are given by (29)–(30). Then we have
[∂Ty1∂µ1V0, · · · , ∂
T
yK
∂µKV0] = 2ξ
T
0
[
P
†
0,12
P
†
0,22
]
+ 2s†T0,2,
[∂Ty1∂µ1Vκ, · · · , ∂
T
yK
∂µKVκ] = 2(z
T
κP
†
κ,13 + x
T
0 P
†
κ,23 + z¯
T
P
†
κ,33) + 2s
†T
κ,3.
Proof. Let P
†col1
0,22 denote the sub-matrix consisting of the first n columns of P
†
0,22. Let P
†row1
0,21 denote the
submatrix consisting of the first n rows of P†0,21, and s
†row1
0,2 be the subvector of the first n entries of s
†
0,2.
We obtain
∂µ1V0 = 2z¯
T
P
†col1
0,22 y1 + 2y
T
1 P
†row1
0,21 x0 + 2y
T
1 s
†row1
0,2 .
Therefore
∂Ty1∂µ1V0 = 2z¯
T
P
†col1
0,22 + 2x
T
0 P
†row1T
0,21 + 2s
†row1T
0,2 .
We similarly calculate ∂Tyl∂µlV0 for l ≥ 2, and obtain the first equality in the lemma. Next we have
∂µlVκ = ∂µl(z¯
T
P
†
κ,33z¯ + 2z¯
T
P
†
κ,31zκ + 2z¯
T
P
†
κ,32x0 + 2z¯
T
s
†
κ,3).
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LetP
†col1
κ,33 be the submatrix consisting of the first n columns ofP
†
κ,33. Then ∂µ1(z¯
T
P
†
κ,33z¯) = 2z¯
T
P
†col1
κ,33 y1,
which gives ∂Ty1∂µ1(z¯
T
P
†
κ,33z¯) = 2z¯
T
P
†col1
κ,33 . We further obtain the second equality. The lemma follows. 
Lemma A.2 We have ∂ylyl∂µlV0 = 0 and ∂ylyl∂µlVκ = 0 for all 1 ≤ l ≤ K .
Proof. This follows from Lemma A.1. 
We proceed to evaluate the right hand side of (27) with the candidate solution (V0, · · · , VK). We have
χ0,1 = ∂
T
x0V0(A0x0 + F
pi
0 z¯) = 2(ξ
T
0 [P
†
0,11,P
†
0,12]
T + s†T0,1)(A0x0 + F
pi
0 z¯),
χ0,2 = |[P
†
0,11,P
†
0,12]ξ0 + s
†
0,1|
2
B0R
−1
0
BT
0
,
χ0,3 = |[I,−Γ
pi
0 ]ξ0 − η0|
2
Q0 ,
χ0,4 = Tr(P
†
0,11D0D0).
Since ∂ylVl(t, yl, x0, µ) = 2[P
†
l,11,P
†
l,12,P
†
l,13]ξl|zl=yl + 2s
†
l,1, we further write
Alyl +Gx0 + F
pi z¯ − (1/2)BR−1BT∂ylVl(t, yl, x0, µ)
= (G−BR−1BTP†l,12)x0 + (Al −BR
−1BTP†l,11)yl
+ (F pi −BR−1BTP†l,13)z¯ −BR
−1BT s†l,1. (A.1)
By (32), (A.1) and Lemma A.1,
χ0,5 − χ0,6 = [∂
T
y1∂µ1V0, · · · , ∂
T
yK∂µKV0]([G
†
,A
†
]ξ0 +m
†)
= 2(ξT0
[
P
†
0,12
P
†
0,22
]
+ s†T0,2)([G
†
,A
†
]ξ0 +m
†). (A.2)
By Lemma A.2, χ0,7 = 0.
We further evaluate the right hand side of (28). We have
χ1 − χ2 = ∂
T
x0Vκ(A0x0 + F
pi
0 z¯)− (1/2)∂
T
x0VκB0R
−1
0 B
T
0 ∂x0V0
= 2([P†κ,21,P
†
κ,22,P
†
κ,23]ξk + s
†
κ,2)
T (A0x0 + F
pi
0 z¯
−B0R
−1
0 B
T
0 ([P
†
0,11,P
†
0,12]ξ0 + s
†
0,1))
= 2([P†κ,21,P
†
κ,22,P
†
κ,23]ξk + s
†
κ,2)
T · [(A0 −B0R
−1
0 B
T
0 P
†
0,11)x0
+ (F pi0 −B0R
−1
0 B
T
0 P
†
0,12)z¯ −B0R
−1
0 B
T
0 s
†
0,1],
χ3 + χ7 = Tr(P
†
κ,22D0D0 +P
†
κ,11DD),
and
χ4 = ∂
T
zκVκ(Aκzκ +Gx0 + F
pi z¯)
= 2([P†κ,11,P
†
κ,12,P
†
κ,13]ξκ + s
†
κ,1)
T (Aκzκ +Gx0 + F
pi z¯),
χ5 = |[P
†
κ,11,P
†
κ,12,P
†
κ,13]ξκ + s
†
κ,1|
2
BR−1B,
χ6 = ξ
T
κ [I,−Γ1,−Γ
pi
2 ]
TQ[I,−Γ1,−Γ
pi
2 ]ξκ
− 2ηTQ[I,−Γ1,−Γ
pi
2 ]ξκ + η
TQη.
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Finally,
χ8 − χ9 = [∂
T
y1∂µ1Vκ, · · · , ∂
T
yK
∂µKVκ]([G
†
,A
†
]ξ0 +m
†)
= 2(zTκP
†
κ,13 + x
T
0 P
†
κ,23 + z¯
T
P
†
κ,33 + s
†T
κ,3)([G
†
,A
†
]ξ0 +m
†),
and by Lemma A.2, χ10 = 0.
By the above calculations, the right hand sides of (27)–(28) may be written as
χ0 = ξ
T
0 Θ0(t)ξ0 + 2ξ
T
0 θ0,1(t) + θ0,2(t), (A.3)
χ = ξTκΘκ(t)ξκ + 2ξ
T
κ θκ,1(t) + θκ,2(t), (A.4)
where
Θ0 = P
†
0
[
A0 F
pi
0
G
†
A
†
]
+
[
A0 F
pi
0
G
†
A
†
]T
P
†
0 −P
†
0B0R
−1
0 B
T
0 P
†
0 +Q
pi
0 ,
θ0,1 =
[
A0 F
pi
0
G
†
A
†
]T
s
†
0 −
[
P
†
0,11
P
†
0,21
]
B0R
−1
0 B
T
0 s
†
0,1 +
[
P
†
0,12
P
†
0,22
]
m
† − η¯pi0 ,
and
Θκ = P
†
κA
†
κ + A
†T
κ P
†
κ −P
†
κBR
−1BTP†κ +Q
pi,
θκ,1 = (A
†T
κ −P
†
κBR
−1BT )s†κ −
P
†
κ,12
P
†
κ,22
P
†
κ,32
B0R−10 BT0 s†0,1 +
P
†
κ,13
P
†
κ,23
P
†
κ,33
m† − η¯pi.
The two terms θ0,2(t) and θκ,2(t) can be determined but we omit the detail here.
Now if (V0, · · · , VK) in (29)–(30) is indeed a solution of the master equations, we necessarily have
ρP†0 − P˙
†
0 = Θ0, ρP
†
κ − P˙
†
κ = Θκ, 1 ≤ κ ≤ K.
Hence, (33) and (34) hold with the corresponding terminal conditions. In addition, (s†0, s
†
1, · · · , s
†
K) satisfies
(35)–(36) as its unique solution.
Conversely, if (33)–(34) has a solution (P†0, · · · ,P
†
K), we further uniquely solve (s
†
0, s
†
1, · · · , s
†
K) from
(35)–(36), and next solve
ρr†0 − r˙
†
0 = θ0,2, ρr
†
κ − r˙
†
κ = θκ,2, 1 ≤ κ ≤ K,
where r
†
0(T ) = η
T
0fQ0fη0f and r
†
κ(T ) = ηTf Qfηf . By the relation (A.3)–(A.4), then (V0, · · · , VK) given
by (29)–(30) is a solution to the master equations. This completes the proof of the theorem.
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